The McCollum Memo

One of the lesser-known documents associated with World War II, the “McCollum Memo,” offers a window into the complex web of geopolitics, strategy, and speculation surrounding the United States’ entry into the war. The memo has been cited by conspiracy theorists as evidence that the U.S. deliberately lured Japan into attacking to precipitate American involvement in the conflict. This article aims to shed light on the memo, its contents, reception, and legacy, and the theory that President Roosevelt may have had ulterior motives related to it.

In 1940, the global situation was deteriorating rapidly. Europe was engulfed in the flames of World War II, and in Asia, Japan’s imperial ambitions were causing tensions to mount. The United States, while not directly involved, was watching developments closely.

Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, who worked in the Office of Naval Intelligence, saw an opportunity for the U.S. to counter Japanese and German advances by strategically positioning itself. He felt that if the U.S. could be drawn into the war on the side of the Allies, it could tip the balance against the Axis powers.

Dated October 7, 1940, the memo outlined an eight-point plan that McCollum believed would lead to Japan committing an overt act of war against the U.S. The steps included:

1. Placing an embargo on all trade with Japan.

2. Establishing a system of embargoes with collaborating nations.

3. Insisting Japan withdraw from China and Indochina.

4. Bolstering defenses in Guam and the Philippines.

5. Alerting the British and Dutch of American intentions to counter Japanese aggression.

6. Assuring China of continued support.

7. Implementing a covert submarine warfare against Japan.

8. Reaching a mutual defense agreement with Britain, aimed primarily at Japan.

While it is evident that many of the policies McCollum suggested were eventually adopted by the U.S., it remains uncertain how much direct influence his memo had on senior policymakers. Many of the actions, such as trade embargoes, were already under consideration due to Japan’s aggression in Asia.

The legacy of the memo is twofold. On one hand, it showcases the foresight some had regarding the looming conflict with Japan. On the other, it feeds into the narrative that the U.S., and specifically Roosevelt, was looking for a backdoor into the war.

This theory posits that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, seeing the necessity of the U.S. entering the war but facing a largely isolationist public, sought to provoke Japan into an attack. The McCollum Memo, in this narrative, is seen as a blueprint for this strategy.

However, while some actions from the memo were indeed implemented, there is no definitive evidence to suggest that Roosevelt or other top officials intentionally sought to provoke a war in the manner described. Instead, many historians argue that while the U.S. was certainly taking steps to counter Japanese aggression, they did not necessarily expect or desire the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The McCollum Memo remains a point of contention among historians and scholars. While it undoubtedly presents a provocative strategy to deal with the Japanese threat, the extent to which it was used as a blueprint for U.S. foreign policy remains debatable. What’s certain, though, is that the document offers a fascinating glimpse into the strategic thinking of the era and the complex factors leading up to the U.S.’s entry into World War II.